A simple and procedurally fair game form for nash implementation of the no-envy solution
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Hagiwara, Makoto |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 20.2020, 1, p. 1-5
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Subject: | Nash implementation | no-envy solution | procedural fairness | simple game form | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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