A Simple Auction Mechanism for Locating Noxious Facilities

In this note, we analyze a simple auction mechanism for locating noxious facilities such as hazardous waste dumps, prisons, and trash disposal plants. Specifically, we first delineate the details of our auction mechanism. Next, we solve for the symmetric equilibrium of this auction. Finally, we argue that the auction under study is an efficient allocation mechanism

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.
Other Persons:	Beladi, Hamid (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Standortwahl \| Location choice \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
Series:	Rochester Institute of Technology Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 11-09
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 12, 2011 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1971422 [DOI]
Classification:	Q53 - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117575