A simpler mechanism that stops agents from cheating
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | Glover, Jonathan |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 62.1994, 1, p. 221-229
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Theorie | Theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
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