A solution to a class of agency problems, with application to the question of limited liability
Year of publication: |
1993
|
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Authors: | Mehta, Shailendra Raj |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 43.1993, 2, p. 193-197
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory |
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