A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Pitchford, Rohan ; Snyder, Christopher M. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 114.2004, 1, p. 88-103
|
Subject: | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Volkswirtschaftliche Investitionstheorie | Theory of aggregate investment | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Theorie | Theory |
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