A solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well-informed : comment
Year of publication: |
1997
|
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Authors: | Ziss, Steffen |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 87.1997, 1, p. 231-235
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods |
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