A strategic analysis of global warming: Theory and some numbers
We model the global warming process as a dynamic commons game in which the players are countries, their actions at each date produce emissions of greenhouse gases, and the state variable is the current stock of greenhouse gases. The theoretical analysis is complemented by a calibration exercise. The first set of results establishes theoretically, and then with illustrative numbers, the over-emissions due to a "tragedy of the commons." The power of simple sanctions to lower emissions and increase welfare is then examined as is the effect of cost asymmetry. Finally, a complete theoretical charactrization is provided for the best equilibrium, and it is shown that it has a very simple structure; it involves a constant emission rate through time.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Dutta, Prajit K. ; Radner, Roy |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 71.2009, 2, p. 187-209
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Global warming Dynamic games Treaty Calibration |
Saved in:
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