A Strategic Mediator Who is Biased into the Same Direction as the Expert Can Improve Information Transmission

This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some information transmission is possible with unmediated communication

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Mechtenberg, Lydia ; Münster, Johannes
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Experten \| Experts \| Systematischer Fehler \| Bias \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Theorie \| Theory \| Vermittlungstätigkeit \| Intermediation \| Kommunikation \| Communication

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (21 p)
Series:	WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2010-19
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 20, 2010 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1816282 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183132