A strong paradox of multiple elections

We consider a stronger version of the paradox of multiple elections and show that it is possible that not only the winning combination of propositions, but also all the combinations sufficiently close to it, receive zero votes.

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Year of publication:	1998-02-27
Authors:	Scarsini, Marco
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 15.1998, 2, p. 237-238
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 8 April 1997/Accepted: 18 April 1997
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369457