A structure theorem for rationalizability with application to robust predictions of refinements
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Weinstein, Jonathan ; Yildiz, Muhamet |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 75.2007, 2, p. 365-400
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Rationalität | Rationality | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory |
-
Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability
Ely, Jeffrey C., (2006)
-
The [alpha]-beauty contest : choosing numbers, thinking intervals
De Giorgi, Enrico, (2008)
-
Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability
Ely, Jeffrey C., (2004)
- More ...
-
Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games
Yildiz, Muhamet, (2016)
-
Impact of higher-order uncertainty
Weinstein, Jonathan, (2003)
-
Finite-order implications of any equilibrium
Weinstein, Jonathan, (2004)
- More ...