A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Sato, Shin |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 148.2013, 1, p. 259-278
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Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Betrug | Fraud | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Theorie | Theory |
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