A test of the public choice theory of economic sanctions
Models of the form of sanctions are constructed to test Kaempfer and Lowenbergs' public choice theory of economic sanctions using the Hufbauer, et al. dataset. The key explanatory variable is presanction trade linkage between sender and target. If sanctions are primarily coercive, trade linkage and the propensity to choose trade sanctions should be positively related. If public choice considerations are dominant the propensity to choose trade sanctions should vary inversely with trade linkage. The results presented are consistent with the public choice interpretation.
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Bonetti, Shane |
Published in: |
Applied Economics Letters. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 1350-4851. - Vol. 4.1997, 12, p. 729-732
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Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
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