A Theory of Corporate Boards and Forced CEO Turnover

We model a corporate board evaluating a CEO of uncertain management ability. Each director receives a noisy private signal about CEO ability, after which directors discuss this ability and vote to retain or replace the CEO. Directors care about true CEO ability, since it affects their equity holding values; however, a CEO may impose costs of dissent on a director who votes to fire but fails to oust her. We relate the equilibrium CEO firing decision to board size, board composition, the effect of an imprecise public signal, and the cost and probability of finding a good replacement CEO

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Chemmanur, Thomas J.
Other Persons:	Fedaseyeu, Viktar (contributor)
Publisher:	[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Vorstand \| Executive board \| Arbeitsmobilität \| Labour mobility \| Unternehmenserfolg \| Firm performance \| Führungswechsel \| Executive turnover

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (87 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Forthcoming in Management Science Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 20, 2016 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1647645 [DOI]
Classification:	G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008838