A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Miller, David A. ; Watson, Joel |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 81.2013, 6, p. 2303-2350
|
Subject: | Relational contracts | repeated games | self-enforcement | equilibrium selection | bargaining | renegotiation | disagreement | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
-
Relational contracting, repeated negotiations, and hold-up : conference paper
Kranz, Sebastian, (2013)
-
Relational contracting, repeated negotiations, and hold-up
Kranz, Sebastian, (2013)
-
Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up
Kranz, Sebastian, (2013)
- More ...
-
Conservation agreements : relational contracts with endogenous monitoring
Gjertsen, Heidi, (2021)
-
Relational contracting, negotiation, and external enforcement
Watson, Joel, (2020)
-
Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement
Miller, David A., (2018)
- More ...