A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Krasikov, Ilia |
Other Persons: | Lamba, Rohit (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Liquiditätsbeschränkung | Liquidity constraint |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (50 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 28, 2020 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.2909334 [DOI] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; G00 - Financial Economics. General |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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