A Theory of Favoritism in an International Oligopoly
This paper offers an explanation of the fact that some foreign firms are favored at the expense of others, and characterizes the distribution of favors in terms of the cost parameters of firms. We present a model where favors must be bought: they come from competing contributions. This model is compared with a benchmark model with a benevolent government. We show how the distribution of favors in the favor-seeking model deviates from the distribution that would be obtained if the government were really benevolent. Copyright © 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Long, Ngo Van ; Soubeyran, Antoine |
Published in: |
Review of International Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0965-7576. - Vol. 15.2007, 3, p. 481-498
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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