A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Roemer, John E. |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 36.2011, 3/4, p. 383-421
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Subject: | Einkommensteuer | Income tax | Politische Partei | Political party | Wettbewerb | Competition | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | USA | United States |
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