A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure
We study disclosure of information about the multidimensional state of the world when uninformed receivers' actions affect the sender's utility. Given a disclosure rule, the receivers form an expectation about the state following each message. Under the assumption that the senderfs expected utility is written as the expected value of a quadratic function of those conditional expectations, we identify conditions under which full and no disclosure is optimal for the sender and show that a linear transformation of the state is optimal if it is normally distributed. We apply our theory to advertising, political campaigning, and monetary policy.
Year of publication: |
2012-01
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Authors: | Tamura, Wataru |
Institutions: | Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University |
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