A theory of social license when regulatory pressure is jointly produced by an EPA and an NGO
Year of publication: |
2018
|
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Authors: | Heyes, Anthony ; Oestreich, Andreas Marcel |
Published in: |
Journal of regulatory economics. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0922-680X, ZDB-ID 1027173-9. - Vol. 54.2018, 3, p. 219-243
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Subject: | Environmental regulation | NGOs | Private politics | Social license | Strategic delegation | Nichtregierungsorganisation | Non-governmental organization | Theorie | Theory | Umweltpolitik | Environmental policy | Lizenz | Licence | Regulierung | Regulation |
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