A theory of socially inefficient patent holdout
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Llobet, Gerard ; Padilla, Atilano Jorge |
Published in: |
Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS. - Boston, Mass. [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1530-9134, ZDB-ID 1481233-2. - Vol. 32.2023, 2, p. 424-449
|
Subject: | Lizenz | Licence | Patentrecht | Patent law | Rechtsprechung | Court decisions | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics |
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