A theory of strategic oversight : congress, lobbyists, and the bureaucracy
Year of publication: |
1995
|
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Authors: | Ėpštejn, David B. |
Other Persons: | O'Halloran, Sharyn (contributor) |
Published in: |
The journal of law, economics, & organization. - Cary, NC [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 8756-6222, ZDB-ID 634985-7. - Vol. 11.1995, 2, p. 227-255
|
Subject: | Verwaltungskontrolle | Political control | Bürokratietheorie | Theory of bureaucracy | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
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