A Theory of the Firm : Governance, Residual Claims, and Organizational Forms

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- I Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control -- 1 U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s -- 2 The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems -- 3 Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy -- II Agency Costs, Residual Claims, and Incentives -- 4 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure -- 5 Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory -- 6 Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination -- 7 Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions -- 8 The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index