A theory of user fee competition

We develop a two-region model where the decentralized provision of spillover goods and other public expenditures is financed by means of user fees. We show that a decentralized solution tends to be inefficient. If the regional spillover goods are substitutes, user fees tend to be inefficiently low, whereas they tend to be inefficiently high if the spillover goods are complements.

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Year of publication:	2007-04
Authors:	Fuest, Clemens ; Kolmar, Martin

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Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Notes:	Fuest, Clemens and Kolmar, Martin (2007) A theory of user fee competition. Journal of Public Economics, 91 (3-4). pp. 497-509.
Other identifiers:	10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.008 [DOI]
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011425261