A Tragedy of the Clubs : Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions

We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the "tragedy of the clubs". The tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Manzini, Paola ; Mariotti, Marco
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Markteintritt \| Market entry \| Clubtheorie \| Club theory \| Koalition \| Coalition \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (42 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 1999 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.200629 [DOI]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014172833