A two-sided reputation result with long run

Cripps et al. (2005) conjectured that in an infinitely repeated game with two equally patient players, if there is positive probability that the players could be Stackelberg types, then equilibrium behavior would resemble a war of attrition, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In this note we show that this conjecture is indeed true for a wide set of stage games for which the one-sided reputation result of Atakan and Ekmekci (2008) holds.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Atakan, Alp E. ; Ekmekci, Mehmet
Publisher:	Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Subject:	Repeated Games \| Reputation \| Equal Discount Factor \| Long-run Players \| War of Attrition

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Series:	Discussion Paper ; 1510
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	637698347 [GVK] hdl:10419/59677 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1510 [RePEc]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282930