A UNIQUE SOLUTION TO N-PERSON SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING.
Year of publication: |
1989
|
---|---|
Authors: | ASHEIM, G.B. |
Institutions: | Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH) |
Subject: | game theory | economic equilibrium | optimization |
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