A Variance Screen for Collusion

In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by sixteen percent, the standard deviation increased by over two hundred percent. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for "pockets" of low price variation as indicators of collusion in the retail gasoline industry in Louisville. We observe no such areas around Louisville in 1996-2002

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. ; Taylor, Christopher T. ; Froeb, Luke M. ; Geweke, John
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Kartell \| Cartel \| Preismanagement \| Pricing strategy \| Tankstelle \| Filling station \| Theorie \| Theory \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (27 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2005 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.683922 [DOI]
Classification:	L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; D40 - Market Structure and Pricing. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028216