A Veto Alternative to Punishment : The Power to Annul an Economic Exchange Promotes Investment During Fairness and Trust Games

Fairness and trust appraisals that engender economic exchange rely on thoughts about another person’s mind to satisfy self- (profit maximising) and other-regarding (social motives) preferences. Punishment should promote fairness and trust within economic exchange, guarding against free-riding and trust violations, but depends on other-regarding preferences concerned with the violator. Here, we explore an alternative to punishment that may instead promote self-regarding preferences—the opportunity for the decision-maker to annul (veto) the economic transaction. We test this veto approach by having participants assume the role of investor(s) in modified versions of the public goods (Studies one and three) and trust games (Studies two and four). Across four studies both online and in laboratory with two economic games, investor(s) could veto a transaction—annul a previous exchange—if the return from the other player(s) was deemed unsatisfactory. We find that this manipulation increased investment by the investor(s), consistent with games where second-party punishment is possible. Moreover, self-regarding preferences predicted veto behaviour, while other-regarding preferences predicted punishment behaviour. We argue that this veto approach can be an alternative to punishment that can safe-guard fairness and trust during economic exchange