A Welfare Criterion for Models with Distorted Beliefs
This paper proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs. Instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct, our criterion asserts an allocation to be belief-neutral efficient (inefficient) if it is efficient (inefficient) under any convex combination of agents' beliefs. While this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations, it can identify positive- and negative-sum speculation driven by conflicting beliefs in a broad range of economic environments.
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Xiong, Wei ; Simsek, Alp ; Brunnermeier, Markus |
Institutions: | Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
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