A well-behaved index of a priori P-power for simple n-person games
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Felsenthal, Dan S. |
Published in: |
Homo oeconomicus : HOE ; journal of behavioral and institutional economics. - Cham, Switzerland : Springer International Publishing, ISSN 2366-6161, ZDB-ID 2130765-9. - Vol. 33.2016, 4, p. 367-381
|
Subject: | Indices of voting power | N-person simple games | I-power | P-power | Postulates for a reasonable P-power index | Winning coalitions of least size | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koalition | Coalition | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
Description of contents: | Description [doi.org] |
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