Absorbent Stable Sets
This paper suggests a general framework to deal with learning, dynamics and evolution in games and economic environments. In this general set-up we define a (set-valued) solution concept and prove some properties, including existence. We then discuss more specific dynamical processes and show that the general solution concept provides quite intuitive results for various contexts.
Year of publication: |
1991-04
|
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Authors: | Gilboa, Itzhak ; Samet, Dov |
Institutions: | Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management |
Saved in:
freely available
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