Accelerated Vesting in Takeovers : The Impact on Shareholder Wealth

We study the impact of accelerated vesting of equity awards on takeovers, whereby the restricted stock and/or stock options of the target CEO immediately vest and become unrestricted upon the close of the acquisition. We find that takeover premiums are significantly larger when the target CEO receives the benefit of accelerated vesting as compared to target firms with CEO's that continue to vest in their awards after the deal closes. Our evidence suggests that these cash windfalls triggered by accelerated vesting are beneficial to shareholders in completed deals. Accelerated vesting appears to be an efficient form of ex-ante managerial contracting

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Elkinawy, Susan
Other Persons:	Offenberg, David (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Übernahme \| Takeover \| Aktionäre \| Shareholders \| Shareholder Value \| Shareholder value \| Börsenkurs \| Share price \| Ankündigungseffekt \| Announcement effect \| Großbritannien \| United Kingdom

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (47 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Financial Management, Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 7, 2011 erstellt
Classification:	G00 - Financial Economics. General ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; G39 - Corporate Finance and Governance. Other ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; H32 - Firm
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117248