Access to Commitment Devices Reduces Investment Incentives in Oligopoly
Year of publication: |
2006-06-06
|
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Authors: | Grimm, Veronika ; Zoettl, Gregor |
Institutions: | Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät |
Subject: | Investment incentives | commitment devices | oligopoly | demand fluctuations | forward markets |
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