Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy
We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Acconcia, Antonio ; Immordino, Giovanni ; Piccolo, Salvatore ; Rey, Patrick |
Published in: |
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 1467-9442. - Vol. 116.2014, 4, p. 1116-1159
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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