Active agents, passive principals; the role of the chief executive in corporate strategy formulation and implementation
Year of publication: |
2000-10-01
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Authors: | Dow, James |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Oxford University |
Subject: | agency theory | executive compensation | free-cash-flow theory | strategic complexity |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 2000-FE-06 |
Classification: | G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Dow, James, (2002)
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Lee, Jongsub, (2018)
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Contractual Revisions in Compensation : Evidence from Merger Bonuses to Target CEOs
Fich, Eliezer M., (2015)
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Equilibrium Investment and Asset Prices under Imperfect Corporate Control
Dow, James, (2005)
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Dow, James, (2006)
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Dow, James, (2004)
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