Activists versus Captured Regulators

We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight costs. Yet we find that activism may increase social welfare because it disciplines captured regulators and reduces the social cost of imperfect regulatory systems

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Daubanes, Julien ; Rochet, Jean-Charles
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Regulierung \| Regulation \| Interessenpolitik \| Lobbying

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 4444
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 31, 2013 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2348064 [DOI]
Classification:	D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315703