Ad valorem taxes and the fiscal gap in federations
This paper shows that the federal government can always achieve the second-best optimum of public good provision, but a precise evaluation of the fiscal gap requires an explicit consideration of the underlying fundamentals of the federal economy.
Year of publication: |
2008
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---|---|
Authors: | Kotsogiannis, Christos ; MartiĀnez, Diego |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 99.2008, 3, p. 431-434
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
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