Adaptive artificial agents play a finitely repeated discrete principal-agent game
Year of publication: |
1997
|
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Authors: | Vilà, Xavier |
Published in: |
Simulating social phenomena. - Berlin [u.a.] : Springer, ISBN 3-540-63329-4. - 1997, p. 437-456
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Lernprozess | Learning process | Computerunterstützung | Computerized method | Evolutionsökonomik | Evolutionary economics | Theorie | Theory |
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