Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium

This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment.

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Year of publication:	1998-12-04
Authors:	Groes, Ebbe ; Jacobsen, Hans JÛrgen ; Sloth, Birgitte
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 13.1999, 1, p. 125-142
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596662