Additionality when REDD contracts must be self-enforcing
Year of publication: |
January 2018
|
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Authors: | Cordero Salas, Paula ; Roe, Brian ; Sohngen, Brent |
Published in: |
Environmental & resource economics : the official journal of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0924-6460, ZDB-ID 1121258-5. - Vol. 69.2018, 1, p. 195-215
|
Subject: | Carbon sequestration | Climate change | Contracts | Development | Institutions | REDD | Self-enforcement | Klimawandel | Treibhausgas-Emissionen | Greenhouse gas emissions | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | CO2-Speicherung | Carbon capture | Vertrag | Contract | Klimaschutz | Climate protection |
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