Adverse selection and M&A design: The roles of alliances and IPOs
This paper investigates strategic alliances and initial public offerings (IPOs) as factors that potentially mitigate the risk of adverse selection in acquisitions. It is hypothesized that prior alliances between acquirers and targets as well as IPOs undertaken by targets reduce adverse selection in M&A. Examining the consideration used in M&A transactions to reflect the allocation of overpayment risk, we find that targets' prior alliances with acquirers and targets' IPOs reduce the likelihood of using stock, or the amount of stock used, to finance acquisitions. We also present evidence that alliances and IPOs substitute for one another.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Reuer, Jeffrey J. ; Ragozzino, Roberto |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 66.2008, 2, p. 195-212
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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