Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance
David L. Fuller
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Fuller, David L. |
| Published in: |
Journal of monetary economics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-3932, ZDB-ID 191155-7. - Vol. 62.2014, p. 108-122
|
| Subject: | Unemployment insurance | Non-participation | Adverse selection | Moral hazard | Dynamic contracts | Adverse Selektion | Moral Hazard | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Anreiz | Incentives | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437701