Adverse selection, endogenous borrowing constraints and firm growth
If banks face asymmetric information about loan quality, endogenous borrowing constraints which restrict the size of new firms may emerge in equilibrium. High quality firms reduce financing costs by starting off small and increasing their size over time.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fishman, Arthur ; Krausz, Miriam |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 108.2010, 2, p. 219-221
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Endogenous borrowing constraints Firm growth Asymmetric information |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Adverse selection, endogenous borrowing constraints and firm growth
Fishman, Arthur, (2010)
-
Adverse selection, endogenous borrowing constraints and firm growth
Fishman, Arthur, (2010)
-
Government loan guarantees and the credit decision‐making structure
Ben‐Yashar, Ruth, (2018)
- More ...