Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Dionne, Georges ; Fombaron, Nathalie ; Doherty, Neil A. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Vertrag | Contract | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Versicherungsökonomik | Economics of insurance | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (74 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 20, 2012 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.2132555 [DOI] |
Classification: | D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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