Agency cost of CEO perquisites in bank loan contracts
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chan, Chia-Ying ; Hasan, Iftekhar ; Lin, Chih-Yung |
Published in: |
Review of quantitative finance and accounting. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 1573-7179, ZDB-ID 2009625-2. - Vol. 56.2021, 4, p. 1221-1258
|
Subject: | CEO perquisites | Agency cost | Loan spread | Corporate governance | Compensation schemes | Führungskräfte | Managers | Corporate Governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Kredit | Credit | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Kapitalkosten | Cost of capital | Bank | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Executive compensation |
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