Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Online-Ressource (XVIII, 533p. 37 illus)

online resource

PrologueSection 1 Agency Theory and Risk Sharing -- Agent and Principal -- Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information -- Risk Sharing and Subcontracting -- Section 2 Information and Incentives -- Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems -- Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts -- Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for the Allocation of Public Goods -- Incentives to Forecast Honestly -- Section 3 Capital Markets and Moral Hazard -- Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues -- The Liquidation Decision as a Principal-Agent Problem -- On Stakeholders’ Unanimity -- Section 4 Financial Contracting and Dividends -- Signalling and Market Behavior -- Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information -- Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual Analysis -- Section 5 External Accounting and Auditing -- The Financial Theory of Agency as a Tool for an Analysis of Problems in External Accounting -- Asymmetric Information between Investors and Managers under the New German Accounting Legislation -- Auditing in an Agency Setting -- Investigation Strategies with Costly Perfect Information -- Section 6 Coordination in Groups -- Managers as Principals and Agents -- Misperceptions, Equilibrium, and Incentives in Groups and Organizations -- Intertemporal Sharecropping: A Differential Game Approach -- Section 7 Property Rights and Fairness -- Mangerialism versus the Property Rights Theory of the Firm -- Contract, Agency, and the Delegation of Decision Making -- A Note on Fair Equality of Rules -- Section 8 Agency Costs -- Agency Costs and Transaction Costs: Flops in the Principal-Agent-Theory of Financial Markets -- Agency Costs are not a “Flop”! -- About Contributors -- Author Index.

10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1 [DOI]

ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW