Agenda Control in Coalition Formation.

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Bloch, F. ; Rottier, S.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	COALITIONS \| GOVERNMENT \| SOCIAL CHOICE \| GAME THEORY

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	29 pages
Classification:	D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; H10 - Structure and Scope of Government. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478947