Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet

I consider a gamble where the sum of the distributed payoffs is proportionate to the number of participants. I show that no subset of the population can agree to participate in the bet, if the size of the group is commonly known. Repeated announcements of the number of the participants leads the population to agree not to bet.

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Year of publication:	2007-06-18
Authors:	Tsakas, Elias
Institutions:	Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan
Subject:	Gamble \| private information \| communication \| common knowledge

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Extent:	text/html
Series:	Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Working Papers in Economics Number 254 9 pages
Classification:	D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations ; D89 - Information and Uncertainty. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423919