Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures

Given the regularity condition on posteriors proposed in Lehrer and Samet (2011), we show that Lehrer and Sametʼs (2011) characterization of agreeing to agree in countable-information models cannot be extended to uncountable-information models. This answers an open question raised in Lehrer and Samet (2011).

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Xiong, Siyang
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 74.2012, 1, p. 442-446
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Common knowledge \| Common prior \| Posterior

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049797