Aldrich-Vreeland Emergency Currency as a Lender of Last Resort

This paper investigates borrowing from a lender of last resort at the individual bank level using data from a pre-Federal Reserve lender of last resort program, the Aldrich-Vreeland Emergency Currency Act of 1908. Contrary to the reluctance to borrow hypothesis, banks with lower capital/asset ratios were more likely to borrow. Banks with a higher reserve ratio borrowed less.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Hoag, Christopher
Published in:	The Journal of Economics. - Missouri Valley Economic Association - MVEA, ISSN 0361-6576. - Vol. 38.2012, 1, p. 73-88
Publisher:	Missouri Valley Economic Association - MVEA

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; N22 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010561189